If God Is Good, Why Is There Evil?
The strongest objection to belief in God — and the main ways thinkers have responded. Stated fairly, including its real force.
Foundations
The Challenge
- If God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, why does evil exist?
- It is widely regarded as the most serious objection to belief in God.
- We'll state it at full strength before looking at any responses.
- Honesty means not pretending the problem is small.
Key idea: Take it seriously: this is the hardest question, and a fair treatment begins by granting its force.
Source: M. Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief (standard philosophy of religion text).
Foundations
Two Versions of the Problem
- The logical problem claims God and evil are strictly contradictory.
- The evidential problem claims evil makes God's existence unlikely, not impossible.
- Most philosophers think the logical version has largely been answered.
- The evidential version remains a live and forceful debate.
Where things stand: Even many atheist philosophers grant the logical problem failed; the serious discussion now centers on the evidential version.
Source: J. L. Mackie (logical problem); William Rowe (evidential problem); Alvin Plantinga.
Foundations
Key Terms
- Moral evil — suffering caused by free creatures' choices.
- Natural evil — suffering from disease, disasters, and natural processes.
- Theodicy — an attempt to say why God might permit evil.
- Defense — a weaker claim: that God and evil are at least logically compatible.
Source: standard philosophy of religion glossaries.
Responses
The Free Will Defense
- Genuine love and goodness may require free creatures who can also choose wrong.
- A world of beings who freely love may be better than programmed compliance.
- Plantinga's version is widely credited with answering the logical problem.
- It addresses moral evil directly; natural evil needs more (next slides).
Key idea: If real freedom is a great good, permitting its misuse may be the price of a world that can truly love.
Source: A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.
Responses
The Soul-Making Response
- Some goods — courage, compassion, perseverance — may grow only in a world with hardship.
- On this view the world is a place for moral and spiritual development.
- A challenge-free existence might produce shallow, untested character.
- Critics ask whether the sheer amount of suffering is really needed for this.
Source: John Hick, Evil and the God of Love.
Responses
Natural Evil — the Harder Half
- Disasters and disease are harder to tie to free choices.
- Responses include a stable, law-governed world (needed for free action) and creaturely freedom.
- Some appeal to a fallen creation; others to the conditions life itself requires.
- This is widely seen as the tougher part of the problem.
Honest note: Pinning all natural evil on human choices is strained; thoughtful theists treat natural evil as the harder case, not a solved one.
Source: M. Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief; discussion in R. Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil.
The Hard Case
The Evidential Problem at Full Strength
- Rowe points to seemingly pointless suffering — e.g. an animal dying unseen in a forest fire.
- If we can't see a reason, perhaps there is none — making God less likely.
- This is the objection's strongest form, and it deserves a real answer.
- The replies turn on whether our not seeing a reason shows there is none.
The crux: Does “we can't see a good reason for this suffering” show there isn't one? That question drives the whole debate.
Source: William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.”
Responses
The “Skeptical Theism” Reply
- We may not be positioned to see all the goods a reason might secure.
- A limited mind failing to spot God's reasons isn't strong evidence none exist.
- Compare a child who can't see why a painful surgery is good.
- Critics worry this reply, pushed too far, could erode ordinary moral knowledge.
Source: S. Wykstra; M. Bergmann (skeptical theism), with critics noted fairly.
Responses
Suffering and Meaning
- Beyond logic, people ask how to live through suffering, not only how to explain it.
- Many traditions answer with solidarity: God enters and shares human suffering.
- In Christianity, the cross is read as God-with-us in pain, not aloof from it.
- This addresses the lived problem even where the intellectual one stays hard.
Key idea: There are two problems here — the philosophical puzzle and the lived ache — and they need different kinds of answers.
Source: M. M. Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God.
Worth Noting
A Cost on the Other Side
- Some argue that calling things genuinely “evil” assumes a real standard of good.
- They ask what grounds that standard if there is no God.
- Atheist thinkers offer answers (e.g. secular accounts of ethics), and the debate continues.
- So the problem of evil connects to larger questions about morality's foundation.
Careful: This is a real argument, not a gotcha — atheists have serious replies. It shows the issue cuts in more than one direction.
Source: contemporary metaethics and philosophy of religion discussions.
Honest Limits
What the Responses Claim
- No response claims to detail God's reason for each particular evil.
- The aim is to show belief in God can be reasonable in the face of evil — not to explain it all away.
- Sincere people weigh the same evidence and reach different conclusions.
- Intellectual honesty means owning what remains genuinely hard.
Key idea: The goal is reasonableness, not a tidy explanation of every tragedy — and the difficulty is real.
Source: M. Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief.
Conclusion
The Big Takeaway
- The logical problem is widely judged answered; the evidential problem remains forceful.
- Free will, soul-making, and skeptical theism are the main lines of response.
- Natural evil and pointless-seeming suffering are the hardest pieces.
- A fair verdict: a serious objection met with serious, if incomplete, answers.
In one line: Belief in God can be reasonable in the face of evil — but the problem stays genuinely weighty.
Source: Plantinga; Hick; Rowe; Adams; Peterson et al.
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